Working better by Van Reenen, John
CentrePiece Summer 20042
CentrePiece Summer 2004 3
F
or economists, labour productivity is the key
indicator of economic health. This is because over
the long haul real income growth must follow
labour productivity growth. If money wages run
ahead of labour productivity, prices eventually
have to rise in order to bring real wages back into line. 
Material wellbeing, of course, must come from earnings.
This is as true whether our spending is financed from
current wages, or by drawing on savings out of past wages,
or by borrowing based on our (perhaps over-optimistic)
expectations of future wages. Government revenue for
transfers, or for services like health and education,
ultimately comes from taxing productivity. So despite the
popular attention on other “proximate” indicators of
economic wellbeing, such as inflation, unemployment or
stock market values, these are largely sideshows in the long
run. Labour productivity has to be where the action is. 
Some critics attack this emphasis on the primacy of 
productivity. They argue that faster productivity growth can
only be accompanied by greater disparities of wealth and
that the costs of greater inequality are too high to bear. In
my view this is completely wrong, both in politics and in
economics. If we can achieve faster economic growth
through productivity improvements, the fruits of this growth
can be used in many different ways. There is nothing to
prevent the additional growth being spent primarily on
benefiting the worst off in our society through greater redis-
tribution or on better public services. Indeed, it may be
easier to get the wealthy to accept such redistributive
measures in the context of faster growth than of slower
growth. When average incomes are stagnating, redistribu-
tion requires an absolute reduction in the income of the
better off to finance transfers to the less well off. It is no
surprise that taxes, always unpopular, are least welcome
during a recession. 
As for the economics, there is no obvious relationship
(either in theory or in practice) between the level of inequal-
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ity in a country and its level of productivity growth.
Although economists tend to emphasise the need for some
degree of inequality to provide incentives, very high levels
of inequality can undermine productivity growth. For
example, it is well recognised that excluding the poor from
getting good levels of schooling can be a fundamental
brake on growth through squandering a country’s talents.
My reading of the empirical research is that there is no
robust statistical relationship between the degree of
inequality and productivity growth. It is true that the United
States has a high level of productivity and a high level of
inequality. But it is equally true that many European
countries with much lower degrees of inequality are able to
match the US productivity performance.
So the idea that there is inevitably a rigid trade off between
equity and efficiency is profoundly mistaken. We can all
share the goal of increasing the size of the economic cake
through higher productivity. The disagreements will be on
how to divide it up.
If productivity – and more specifically labour productivity –
is the key economic goal, how should we measure it? GDP
growth itself is not a good indicator. For example, a good
part of the faster GDP growth of the US compared with
Europe has been due to faster US population growth. The
best single measure of labour productivity is real output per
hour worked. This measure links most closely to hourly
wages, which is the market return for labour. So what are
the facts on this indicator? 
First, output per hour worked is significantly lower in the
UK than in our main competitors. On the latest data from
the market sector, output per hour in Britain was almost
40% below that in the United States. In other words, Jo
Doe in the US could take Thursday and Friday off and still
produce as much as poor John Bull in the UK toiling away
throughout the working week.
The gap with major European economies is also striking.
Despite some recent improvement, output per hour in the
market sector in the UK is around 20% below that of
France and Germany. This may seem to conflict with recent
headlines announcing that Britain now matches Germany in
productivity. This is only true for output per worker, not for
output per hour worked. German output per worker is
similar to that in the UK, but the Germans work less long
hours. The average German employee has the equivalent of
two months’ more holiday a year than the average British
worker and still manages to produce the same output. The
“output per worker” gap widens even further when we
compare ourselves with the US, because Americans work
an average of about 10 hours a month more than we do.
Does this mean that Germans are lazy or that Americans are
workaholics? There should be no presumption that working
longer or shorter hours is any better or worse for productiv-
ity, because it is output per hour worked that matters. In
principle, each society can make its own free choice as to
whether it wants to work longer or shorter hours. 
Figure 1:   Relative output per hour worked, 1999
Source: O’Mahony and de Boer, 2002, market economy data
US 139
France 122
Germany 119
UK 100
Figure 2:   Average annual hours per worker, 2002
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2003
US 1,800
France 1,390
Germany 1,360
UK 1,680
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This is the context in which the data on British performance
need to be analysed. On the surface, Britain’s output per
person is satisfactory. Although we still remain a way behind
the US, we are pretty close to the French and Germans.
The main reason for this is simple. In recent decades Britain
has had a much more successful record in getting people
into jobs than other main European countries. The proportion
of working age people in jobs is 73% in the UK, compared
with 65% in Germany and 61% in France.
It is hard to argue that these lower employment rates in
Europe are the result of benign social choices. The large
numbers of young people, older people and women who are
not working in Germany and France might have chosen to do
so, if their national institutions had been different. The higher
measured productivity of Continental Europe compared with
the UK may well in part reflect the fact that so many low
productivity Germans and French are excluded from the
employment numbers. It is easy to improve your measured
productivity by keeping the least skilled workers out of a job.
However, this is unlikely to be the full story, as British produc-
tivity was lower than the French or German even in the 1980s
when the UK had much higher unemployment than they did. 
If the latest data do point to a continuing UK labour produc-
tivity gap, is it bigger or smaller than it used to be? It is useful
to distinguish between three key periods.
n First, after 1945 Britain and the other Western European
countries enjoyed a “golden age” of economic growth.
Europeans were chasing the US productivity frontier. This
catching up was driven by the spread of new ideas from the
US to the rest of what now constitutes the OECD. Because
catching up is easier than innovating at the technological
frontier, US productivity growth was generally slower than in
Western Europe. However, the catch-up process was much
slower for the UK than for France and Germany and we
slipped down the productivity rankings. Research at the CEP
has shown that part of the reason for slower UK catch up,
historically, is due to relatively low levels of investment in R&D
and human capital.
n The second period is more of a mixed story. Following the
oil shocks of the mid-1970s, the productivity growth rates in
both the US and Europe slowed significantly. From about
1980 productivity began to rise in the UK, especially in
manufacturing. The deregulation of product and labour
markets helped to halt the UK’s long relative productivity
decline. But, though we started to do better in absolute
terms, it was not enough to significantly improve our
position in the productivity rankings.
n Third, there appears to have been a structural shift in US
productivity growth in the mid-1990s. It went from about
1.2% a year between 1977 and 1995 to 2.2% a year
between 1995 and 2001. Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) were an important part of the explana-
tion of faster US productivity growth in the late 1990s. The
falls in quality-adjusted computer prices accelerated after
1994 and led to big productivity growth in sectors like
semiconductors and retailing. These growth rates were not
matched in European countries and the previous long
convergence between US and Europe productivity
staggered to a halt.
Figure 3:   Employment rate of working age 
population, 2002
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2003
US 72
France 61
Germany 65
UK 73
Figure 4:   Change in annual growth in output from
1990-95 to 1995-2001
Source: O’Mahony and Van Ark, 2003
US EU
ICT using 
sectors 3.5 -0.1
ICT 
producing 1.9 1.6
sectors
Non-ICT 
sectors -0.5 -1.1
It is not clear why Europe is lagging behind
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From an accounting point of view, the main reason for this
third period was the slower productivity growth in those
European sectors using ICT intensively like retail, wholesal-
ing and finance. Productivity in the ICT-using sectors in the
US grew during the late 1990s at around 5% a year, more
than twice as fast as its rate of growth in the first half of the
1990s. The same sectors in Europe only saw growth of 2%
a year, slightly less than in the early 1990s. Since it is likely
that ICT is available at about the same price in Europe as in
the US, it is not clear why Europe is lagging behind. It is a
fact, however, that as the IT revolution introduced new
forms of capital European economies failed to exploit its
benefits in terms of enhanced productivity and prosperity as
fully as did the US.
This does not appear to be due to measurement error or 
to the “bubble economy” of the late 1990s, since US
productivity growth continued to roar ahead in the 21st
century despite the hi-tech crash in 2001 and despite the
impact of 9/11.
What was happening to UK productivity during this period?
The most recent data seem to show that here the UK has in
fact held its own with US since 1995 – a remarkable
achievement given the strong showing of the US. There has
also been some narrowing of the UK productivity gap with
France and Germany since the beginning of the 1990s.
However, as we have seen, the UK still carries a significant
labour productivity deficit and it is unclear whether the
momentum of recent years will close the gap there with
France and Germany. 
In formal terms, the productivity gap between Britain and
another country can be broken down into two parts: first,
the quantity of the inputs and, second, how they are used.
There are two key types of input. One relates to capital.
Giving workers more and better equipment to use should
enable them to produce more output from a given hour
US 3.1
France 2.0
Germany 2.5
UK 3.0
Figure 5:   Annual growth rates in output per hour,
market economy, 1995-2001
Source: O’Mahony. Groningen
worked. Economists call this “capital deepening”: more
capital per worker means higher output per worker. 
The other type of input relates to skills. Here, improving the
human capital of an economy by increasing the supply of
education should also raise productivity. But inputs do not
explain the whole story, which is where different ways of
working come in. After we have deducted the contributions
of capital and skills from output per hour we are usually left
with an explained residual element that goes under the
rather inelegant name of “total factor productivity”.
Differences in total factor productivity relate to different
ways of working, for example through better ways of organ-
ising firms or using better technology. They help explain
what we do with our fixed capital and our human capital.
How does the UK compare on these measures? 
If labour productivity is about the amount of capital and how
it is used, we have a substantial gap with France, Germany
and the US. Britain has much lower capital invested per
hour worked than other major countries and this accounts
for around 80% of our labour productivity gap with 
France and Germany. Add in the UK’s skill deficit and this
explains just about the whole productivity gap with
Continental Europe. 
However, this is not true of our productivity gap in relation
to the US. Increasing the proportion of machines to workers
to American levels would only make up about half of the
gap. Nor would higher skill levels close the gap. Around half
the gap between UK and US labour productivity is due to
higher US total factor productivity – in other words, to
different ways of working. 
More capital per worker means more output per worker
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This leaves us two key questions. First, why is there less
capital per hour worked in Britain? And, second, what is the
secret of the US productivity story if it is not in fixed or
human capital?
Part of the story on capital is government failure.
Government investment in roads, houses, schools and
hospitals historically has been low in the UK compared with
other countries. Basic numeracy and literacy skills amongst
the adult population in Britain – key components of our
human capital – are also notoriously poor. This may be
slowly changing with educational reform, but low adult skills
may be a factor behind low investment. 
Another important part of the capital story, however, may be
that UK managers choose to invest less than their foreign
counterparts because the return is lower. Why invest in new
plant or IT that will not deliver a significant return?
This leads us to the second question. Why do US workers
create so much more output for their fixed and human
capital inputs? What is it that they do to work more effec-
tively that makes such a significant difference on a macro-
economic level? The answers must address both of these
questions by digging below the figures to understanding
what drives productivity – at the business level. 
To tackle these questions the CEP has launched a new
programme on Innovation and Productivity. One stream of
this work will be to rigorously investigate whether manage-
rial practices are a cause of the productivity gap through
collecting primary data at the firm level across countries.
Initial results suggest that different management practices
are critical in accounting for productivity differences
between countries and within countries. We
also find that the return to ICT use is
much higher in organisations with
management best practice – which
may be why the US has benefited
the most from the recent
technological upheavals. 
The research is at 
an early stage but
Watch This Space for 
more results...
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